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BAR BRIEFS
PROPOSE PLAN FOR WAR MEMORIALS
A plan for the erection of memorials to citizens who have
given their lives for their country in World War II is being studied
by the Executive Committee of the North Dakota Conference of
Social Welfare, headed by Judge G. Grimson of Rugby, president
of the organization.
The plan endorsed by the Conference of Social Welfare which
met recently at Jamestown calls for the encouragement of the
various communities of the state to consider the erection and
maintenance of proper facilities for character building recreation,
and handicraft on the part of the youth during their leisure time
as lasting memorials to their honored citizens who gave their lives
in World War II. It was suggested at the Conference that such
memorials would be particularly fitting as they would afford more
opportunities for the youth of tomorrow to develop better traits
of citizenship through wholesome and proper use of leisure hours.
That can be done by providing playgrounds, handicraft shops,
recreation centers, gymnasiums, swimming pools, etc., each of
which might bear the name of one or more of the heroes who died.
The Executive Committee of the Conference is also studying
two other resolutions passed at the Conference. One deals with
the regulations and licensing of homes for the aged in the state,
and the other with the need for a home for neglected dependent or
pre-delinquent boys and girls. It was explained to the Conference
that there are no existing facilities for the care of youth who
cannot be properly taken care of or disciplined in their own homes,
and yet should not be classed as delinquents or sent to the Train-
ing School.
The Executive Committee, whose members, in addition to
Judge Grimson are: Dr. A. C. Burr of Jamestown, Miss Clarisse
Clementson and Mrs. Earl Shaw of Fargo, A. M. Allen of Thomp-
son, Rev. L. 0. Gjerde of Rugby, Miss Louise Guenthner of Bis-
marck and Mrs. 0. H. Lundquist of Adams, will meet in Bismarck
in December to take action on its findings.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In George Cota, Pltf. and Applt., vs. Lula McDermott, Respt.
That chapter 286, S. L. 1941, providing, among other things, for the
giving of notice of expiration of the period of redemption on property sold
to the county for delinquent taxes, applies to all tax deed proceedings initi-
ated subsequent to its effective date.
That where land is sold on norpayment of taxes any right of redemp-
tion given -is wholly statutory, accorded as a matter of legislative favor and
grace. And the right to notice of expiration of the period of redemption
stands on no different ground, so, in the absence of statutory requirement,
no notice need be given.
That a delinquent taxpayer has no vested right in any existing mode
of collecting taxes. There is no contract between him and the taxing
authority that the latter will not vary the mode of collection.
That where land is sold on nonpayment of taxes, the resulting relation-
ship as between the taxpayer and the taxing authority is not contractual.
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It results from -the taxpayer's delinquency and the whole proceeding is a
remedy for such delinquency.
That a statute providing for the manner of giving notice of expiration
of the period of redemption different from that prescribed at the time of
tax sale, is not subject to challenge on the ground that it impairs a vested
right of the delinquent taxpayer.
hat where the legislature prescribes the manner in which notice of ex-
piration of the period of redemption shall be given, the requirement thus
imposed must be strictly complied with.
That where the officer charged with the duty of giving notice of ex-
piration of the period of redemption to the delinquent taxpayer follows the
letter of the statute in doing so, the requirement as to service of notice is
satisfied though the taxpayer does not receive such notice.
Appeal from the District Court of Rolete County, Kneeshaw, J. Action
to quiet title. From a judgment for the defendant, plaintiff appeals. RE-
VERSED. Opinion of the court by Nuessle J.
In W. J. McDonald, Plf. and Respt., vs. Mae McDonald MiLer, Deft. and
Applt., Merchants Nat. Bank, Fargo, Deft. and Respt.
That a constructive trust will be imposed by the courts in order to do
equity and prevent unjust enrichment when title to property is acquired
by fraud, duress, undue influence, or is acquired or retained in violation
of a fiduciary duty.
That an express trust in real property cannot be created by parol.
That the existence of a constructvie or resulting trust in real property
may be established by parol evidence that is clear, convincing, and satis-
factory.
That where it is sought to impose a constructive trust upon a convey-
ance of real estate -the existence of a confidential -relationship between the
grantor and grantee is of major importance to be considered in connec-
tion with other facts and circumstances on the case.
That where a -grantor parts with all control over a deed by delivering
to a third person to be delivered to the grantee on the death of the grantor
such delivery to the third person divests the grantor of title.
That in an action to establish a constructive trust in connection with
the conveyance of real estate, declarations of the grantor made prior to or
contemporaneously with the execution, and delivery of the conveyance are
admissible in support of the trust made subsequent to the conveyance and
not in the presence of the grantee are not admissible.
That where a deed has been delivered to a third person to be delivered
to the grantee on the death of the grantor, and thus has become operative to
divest the grantor of title, subsequent declarations of the grantor tending
to impeach the deed are inadmissible.
That subdivision 2,'of sec. 7871, C. L. 1913, may not be extended by
interpretation but its application is confined to the letter thereof.
That in an action between the son and daugher of a deceased grantor
to impress a conveyance of real estate with a trust in property which never
became a part of the grantor's estate, and neither party appears in the
action in the capacity of executor, administrator, personal representative, or
heir of the decedent, the parties are not prohibited by subdv 2 of sec. 7871,
C. L. 1913, from testifying to transactions between themselves and the
deceased.
Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, Swenson, J. RE-
VERSED AND NEW TRIAL ORDERED. Opinion of the Court by Morris,
Ch. J.
In. Russell Bryan and Waldo Bryan,'Pltfs. and Respts., vs. Abe Miller,
Deft. and Applt.
T1hat the requirement that the appellant on appeal to the district court
from a judgment of the justice court must serve and file an undertaking, or
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make a deposit and serve notice of the making of such deposit, is manda-
tory and compliance therewith is a prerequisite to the transfer of jurisdic-
tion to the district court by the appeal.
That appellate jurisdiction is derived, from constitutional or statutory
provisions, can be acquired and exercised only as prescribed by the law,
and cannot be conferred by consent of the parties.
That in North Dakota, district courts are vested by the constitution with
original jurisdiction of all causes both at law and equity, except as other-
wise provided in the constitution and such appellate jurisdiction. as may
be confered by law. Sec. 103, Const.
That the legislature has provided that appeals may be taken to a. dis-
trict court from the judgment of a justice court either (1) on question of
law alone, or (2) on question both of law and fact, and a new trial had in
the district court. C. L. 1913, sec. 9164, 9172.
That it is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it re-
vises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does
not create that cause.
That an appeal from a justice court to a district court for a new trial
of the case in the district court does not involve solely an exercise of ap-
pellate jurisdiction by the district court. The appellate functions are at
an end when the case has been transferred to the district court pursuant
to the prescribed appellate procedure and brought within the jurisdiction
of the district court for trial. The trial of the case anew by the district
court does not involve the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the dis-
trict court, but involves the exercise of the original jurisdiction vested in
the court by the constitution to try and determine civil actions.
That where a court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action,
general appearance, without objection to jurisdiction, and the invoking of
the power of the court in a matter pertaining to and directly affecting the
proceedings to be had in the action, give jurisdiction of the person.
That jurisdiction of the subject-matter is the power to deal with th
general subject involved in the action; it is the power of the court to hear
and determine causes of the general class to which the particular cause
belongs.
That where a judgment has been rendered in an action within the jur-
isdiction of the justice court and a defendant appeals therefrom demanding
a trial anew in the district court, but fails to serve and file a sufficient
undertaking on appeal or make timely deposit in lieu of an undertaking
and, as a result, the appeal is rendered defective in a jurisdictional matter;
but the case is docketed and placed upon the calendar of the district court
and at the time appointed for trial both parties appear without objection,
and the plaintiff submits a written stipulation, entitled in the action as
pending in the district court, providing that an amendment be made by
adding another party plaintiff, and upon such stipulation moves that the
papers in the action be amended accordingly, and the court thereafter
grants the motion and directs the amendment to be made, the action is
brought within the original jurisdiction of the court and it has the same
power to try and determine the action as though it had been commenced
originally in the district court. Deardoff vs. Thorstensen, 16 N. D. 355,
113 N. W. 616, and Aneta Mercantile Company vs. Groseth, 20 N. D. 137,
127 N. W. 718, distinguished.
That when the jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter and
parties has attached by such general appearance and invoking of jurisdic-
tion, the jurisdiction may not thereafter be capriciously terminated by a
party who made such appearance and invoked such jurisdiction; and such
jurisdiction continues until the issues 'have been finally determined, or the
action has been disposed of otherwise according to law.
Appeal from a judgment of the district court of Burleigh County,
McFarland, J., by the defendant. REVERSED. Opinion of the court by
Christianson, J.
